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ABSTRACT The repercussions of the Arab Spring and new polarization between 
Iran, Israel and the Gulf States means the Middle East faces multiple ri-
valries and conflicts. Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Israel and 
the United States seem to have reached an agreement on certain issues in 
an attempt to redesign a fractured regional order. This vision is yet to be 
realized on the ground given the uncertainty around Washington’s global 
role. In assessing regional stakeholders and their potential capabilities as 
well as several scenes of regional conflict, the paper argues Turkey plays a 
traditional role in balancing tensions between Iran, the Gulf and Israel. 
While Turkey does not have a silver bullet, it provides ‘balancing’ support 
to the region, preserving neutral, middle ground.
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Introduction
For the past seven years, the Middle East has been preoccupied with the repercussions of the process known as the Arab Spring. Today, the region lies at the crossroads of multiple rivalries and conflicts. With the notable 
exception of Tunisia’s relatively uncomplicated transition to democracy, the 
Arab revolts unleashed a wave of violence and tensions in Libya, Egypt, Yemen 
and Syria, whose effects the entire region continues to experience. During this 
period, Libya set the stage for a bloody civil war and became a theater of re-
gional competition. Egypt’s democratic progress has been reversed by a mili-
tary coup d’état. Yemen, which suffers from a major humanitarian crisis fueled 
by civil war and military intervention by Saudi Arabia, also experiences addi-
tional tensions due to Iran’s growing influence. Meanwhile, Syria became the 
source of bloody proxy wars and region-wide trauma. By contrast, Iraq, which 
triggered regional fault lines for twenty years, was not directly affected by the 
Arab Spring. In the wake of the 2003 U.S. occupation, however, the country 
became a ‘failed state’ due to instability, sectarian policies and terrorism. The 
country continues its efforts to recover from these crises to this day.
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Over the past twenty years, and particularly in the 
last seven years, Iran has been the clear victor in a 
geopolitical competition with the Gulf and Israel 
–some of the strongest undercurrents in the Mid-
dle East.1 Taking advantage of the U.S. invasion of 
Iraq in 2003, Tehran was able to reap the benefits 
of its pre-1979 Islamic Revolution investments in its 
natural allies in Iraq, Syria and elsewhere in the re-
gion. The country, which played a crucial role in the 
transformation of peaceful protests in Syria to civil 
and proxy war, single-handedly changed the balance 
of power in the conflict zone by deploying militias 
from all over the Shia world. As a matter of fact, Iran 
effectively became the de facto dominant force in Iraq through its proxies, in 
Lebanon through Hezbollah and in Syria due to its most recent military inter-
vention there. At the same time, Tehran strengthened its ties to Shia commu-
nities in the Gulf. Although the country’s efforts ultimately resulted in failure 
in Bahrain, it successfully created a patronage relationship with the Houthis 
in Yemen, a group with traditionally weak links to Iran, to establish a military 
base capable of threatening Saudi Arabia.2
Meanwhile, the opposite camp –the Gulf countries and Israel– experienced 
major strategic setbacks in the wake of Iraq’s occupation and with the consol-
idation of Iranian influence. During this process, Israel and the Gulf countries 
did not always form a united front. However, it is possible to claim that their 
relationship became stronger due to their mutual opposition to Iran. Unlike in 
earlier attacks against Palestinians, Israel has been unable to assert its domi-
nance over Hezbollah. Most recently, the country suffered a humiliating defeat 
against the group in 2006. During the Obama presidency, Israel was concerned 
by Washington’s efforts to use Iran to counterbalance the Sunni bloc in the 
Middle East. As such, Tel Aviv was among the most vocal critics of the nuclear 
agreement between Iran and the West, which alleviated international pressure 
on Tehran. Although the country welcomed Hezbollah’s decision to suspend 
attacks against Israeli targets and concentrate on the Syrian conflict, Israel 
views the group’s potential empowerment in this process as a serious threat. 
Meanwhile, the Gulf countries have been distracted from their rivalry with 
Iran, as they focused on implementing pro-status quo policies and crushing 
revisionist players during the Arab Spring. Moreover, the threat of ‘Iranian 
expansionism’ became far more visible due to Tehran’s growing hard power in 
a range of countries, including Yemen and Syria.
The Trump Administration’s approach to the Middle East created new dimen-
sions in the polarization between Iran, Israel and the Gulf States. Bearing in 
mind that the Obama effect triggered the first wave of chaos in the region, it 
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is possible to argue that President Donald Trump launched the second wave. 
The Qatar crisis and Saudi Arabia’s reform efforts in the wake of Trump’s par-
ticipation in the May 2017 Riyadh summit arguably marked the beginning of a 
new era. In other words, the Trump Administration played a crucial role in the 
most recent developments –which seemingly fit into Iran’s traditional rivalry 
with the Gulf countries and Israel, but also represents an attempt at regional 
design.
Turkey, which stands to experience the side effects of this new era directly, as 
part of the region and with regard to its bilateral relations with third parties, 
has attempted a balancing act in an effort to reduce tensions and prevent vi-
olent conflict between the two sides. As such, Ankara seeks to support coun-
tries, in a difficult position due to growing polarization between Iran, Israel 
and the Gulf, in order to avoid becoming party to polarization while main-
taining neutral middle ground amidst chaos and conflict. At a time when po-
larization grows between great powers, including Russia and the United States 
(U.S.), Turkey has criticized the Gulf indirectly and Iran directly to stress the 
need for regional powers to establish a new order and cooperate more closely.3 
Unhappy with Iran’s regional expansionism and the instability Tehran fuels 
through its proxies, Turkey’s balanced policy could be perceived by the Gulf ’s 
ambitious crown princes as an obstacle to their goals.
Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman’s (MbS) assumption of power, 
the Qatar crisis, high-profile arrests on ‘corruption’ charges, an attempt to 
force Lebanese Prime Minister Saad Hariri to resign, and the use of Iranian 
ballistic missiles by the Houthi rebels to attack Riyadh are among the many 
developments supporting the view that the current situation goes beyond the 
traditional rivalry between Iran, Israel and the Gulf countries. Such a view 
can also be supported by other events such as Trump’s plan to ‘contain’ Iran, 
mounting pressure on Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas to accept Wash-
ington’s ‘peace’ plan, efforts by the United Arab Emirates (UAE) to install its 
proxy, Mohammad Dahlan, as the leader of Palestine, pressure on the Syrian 
opposition by Riyadh to reinvent themselves and the emergence of a special 
relationship between Trump’s son-in-law, Jared Kushner and Riyadh and Abu 
Dhabi. By contrast, these developments effectively suggest there is an attempt 
at regional design. Although public debate has almost exclusively focused on 
domestic changes in Saudi Arabia, the Qatar blockade and growing tensions 
with Iran, it is clear the dispute has regional dimensions and that Saudi Arabia, 
the UAE, Israel and the U.S. seem to have reached an agreement on certain 
issues. It is quite unlikely, however, that this agreement –an attempt at regional 
design– will play a founding role in the Middle East. Currently, expectations 
are low for at least two reasons: Washington’s changing global role fuels un-
certainty, creates a power vacuum and entails disorder in various parts of the 
world, including Europe, the Middle East and Asia-Pacific. At present, there 
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is a major gap, for example, between U.S. foreign policy and national security 
discourse, the country’s instruments on the ground and the capabilities of its 
alliances. Moreover, Trump Administration’s unilateralist, vulgar and some-
what inconsistent policies, which seek to protect U.S. economic interests, fur-
ther deepen instability. To make matters worse, it is important to note U.S. 
foreign policy and national security discourse has yet to translate into a sus-
tainable and applicable strategy. In other words, Washington’s statements fail 
to make a game-changing impact on the ground. This is largely due to serious 
disagreements and differences of opinion amongst Washington policymakers, 
domestic tensions and the Trump Administration’s inability to exert control 
over the U.S. bureaucracy.
Secondly, the current attitude of the U.S., which desperately needs to set a new 
Middle East policy, creates a balance of power likely to transform regional ten-
sions into hot conflict. The Trump Administration’s Iran strategy, for example, 
seems more likely to transform competition between regional powers into de-
structive tensions –as opposed to creating a new regional order. As seen in Iraq 
and Afghanistan, theoretical comparisons of power and capabilities do not 
necessarily translate to actual influence in the Middle East, where chaos and 
violent conflicts make more room for state and non-state actors alike. Keeping 
in mind that Iran and Russia have been most successful at exploiting those new 
rooms for maneuver, it is possible to conclude that U.S. policy, which promotes 
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Individual Game Plans
A number of major developments took place in the Middle East since Trump 
attended the Riyadh summit in May 2017 meeting with Arab leaders.4 During 
this period, the most notable countries have been Saudi Arabia, where sys-
temic changes are taking place, the UAE, the Gulf ’s most operational country, 
Israel, which has kept a low profile since the Arab Spring except for launching 
occasional airstrikes, the U.S., which entered a period of political chaos since 
Trump’s surprise victory in the 2016 presidential election, and Iran, whose 
expansionist foreign policy secured its place atop the list of national security 
threats in many countries. While refusing to become party to the growing po-
larization in the Middle East, Turkey is concerned by the potential regional 
chaos and conflicts. Provided that most assessments of regional developments 
in recent months have been centered on Saudi Arabia, it would be best to start 
this rundown of individual game plans with Riyadh.
Saudi Arabia: The Risks of Audacious Projects
Fierce competition within the Saudi royal family, which manifested itself in the 
form of power struggle and a game of thrones, has effectively ended to the advan-
tage of MbS. The crown prince sought to become the Kingdom’s de facto leader 
before entering office by launching audacious projects, such as Vision 2030, and 
implementing a series of reforms.5 Recently, the Saudi crown prince had a large 
number of religious scholars arrested and pledged to promote ‘moderate Islam’ 
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in his country.6 Finally, MbS formed the National Anti-Corruption Commission 
to make it clear that no kind of graft shall go unpunished. Although Saudi offi-
cials insist the most recent arrests were part of a crackdown on corruption, the 
international community has remained suspicious of Riyadh’s motives. Though 
the arrests in question represented a selective crackdown on corruption in prac-
tice, their real purpose was to consolidate MbS’ power over the economy, the 
political arena and the national security apparatus to clear his path to the crown 
and silence critics of his reform agenda and foreign policy initiatives.
To be clear, the rise of MbS to crown prince was rapid and it is impossible to iso-
late this process from regional discussions. Backed by Mohammed bin Zayed 
(MbZ), the UAE’s crown prince, MbS was presented to Saudi and international 
(particularly American) audiences as the most suitable candidate for the Saudi 
crown. According to leaked email messages of the UAE ambassador Yousef 
al-Otaiba to Washington, policy makers in Washington were told that MbS 
was the man to transform Saudi Arabia.7 Meanwhile at home, the Saudi crown 
prince took advantage of King Salman’s debilitating medical condition to take a 
series of steps that would clear his path to power –all under the umbrella of his 
father’s authority. As mentioned above, those steps were geared toward tight-
ening his grip on the Saudi security apparatus, eliminating political opponents 
and rivals, and arresting en masse individuals with mass economic power. Had 
it not been for a series of crucial steps taken by the Saudi-led axis, perhaps 
these changes could have been considered part and parcel of the country’s do-
mestic politics. The Qatar blockade, the forcible resignation of Lebanese Prime 
Minister Saad Hariri, the missile attack against Riyadh (which confirmed Iran’s 
involvement in Yemen), Saudi Arabia’s rapprochement with Israel, the ongoing 
search for a new leader in Palestine, lengthy negotiations with Trump’s son-in-
law Jared Kushner,8 efforts to shape the Syrian opposition and dialogue with 
some members of the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) and the desig-
nated terrorist organization PKK in Syria and Iraq, however, suggest that MbS’ 
pursuit of power fits into a broader regional context. Likewise, the fact that the 
Saudi crown prince set a number of challenging regional goals while simulta-
neously disturbing the traditional balance of power in his country suggests that 
his domestic agenda was in sync with his regional actions.
In this regard, MbS’ emphasis on ‘fighting extremism’ and ‘going back to mod-
erate Islam’ must be considered in conjunction with Saudi Arabia’s future goals 
in the Middle East. Clearly, this discourse promises to create an ideological 
basis for a crackdown by the U.S., Israel, Egypt and several Gulf countries 
against the Shia militias, who have been an important part of Iran’s expan-
sionist agenda. At first, one could reach the conclusion that Saudi Arabia was 
simply trying to attract foreign investors and rehabilitate its image against the 
backdrop of declining oil prices. Instead, those steps must be seen as an effort 
by Riyadh, which has been held responsible for radicalism in the Sunni-Salafi 
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world since the 9/11 terror attacks, to whitewash or 
transform the notion of Wahhabi Islam.
It is clear that the Saudi crown prince’s idea of pro-
moting ‘a version of Islam that is in harmony with 
the West and the world’ will translate into some level 
of social liberalization – as opposed to democratiza-
tion. A broader look, however, reveals that MbS’ real 
objective is to combat Iranian-backed Shia militias 
and make references to ‘moderate Islam’ in an at-
tempt to secure Israel’s support to that campaign. By 
portraying Iran, the Islamic Revolutionary Guard 
Corps and Shia militias as the root cause of radical-
ism in the Middle East, Riyadh expects the Trump 
Administration to focus on Tehran’s expansionist 
agenda. Moreover, it is possible to argue the ‘moderate Islam’ rhetoric seeks 
to replace the polarization between Shia and Sunni-Wahhabis with tensions 
between Arabs and Persians. As such, Saudi Arabia seeks to promote a new 
brand of Arab nationalism in an effort to win the support of Arabs in the ideo-
logical fight against Iran. The country’s efforts to reach out to the Shia commu-
nity in Iraq should be considered part of the same strategy.9
Due to MbS’ audacious foreign policy goals, Saudi Arabia entered a period of 
fragility and high risks. As a matter of fact, the Saudi crown prince, whose per-
formance in Yemen has been subject to widespread criticism, took a huge risk 
by starting his efforts to contain Iran in Lebanon –where Tehran’s most power-
ful proxy, Hezbollah– holds sway. While Riyadh sees eye to eye with Israel and 
the U.S. in Lebanon, it remains unclear to what extent this agreement could 
yield concrete results against Hezbollah. After all, none of the three countries 
seems willing to shoulder the burden on behalf of the others. Instead, all of 
them clearly want the others to take the risks. Meanwhile, the Houthi rebels 
still have considerable operational capabilities in Yemen, where a humanitar-
ian crisis has worsened and Iran’s influence increases uncontrollably. Needless 
to say, the changing balance of power in Saudi Arabia, coupled with an ideo-
logical (as opposed to interest-driven) conflict with countries like Qatar and 
the fragility of Iranian-influenced parts of the Gulf region, render more diffi-
cult the fight against Iran and its proxies. The level of success of his audacious 
steps at home and abroad will determine not just MbS’ political future but also 
Saudi Arabia’s status among countries in the Gulf and the Middle East.
The United States: The Gap between Policies and Objectives
The Trump Administration, which pledged to reverse Barack Obama’s regional 
policy by repairing Washington’s relations with traditional U.S. allies, engaged 
in a series of talks with Saudi Arabia and Israel. Trump, who traveled to Saudi 
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Arabia on his first overseas trip 
on May 20-22, 2017, left the King-
dom after making strongly-worded 
statements about Iran and signing 
a number of lucrative arms deals.10 
Over the following months, he took 
steps to undermine the Iran nuclear 
deal –one of the Obama adminis-
tration’s most significant foreign 
policy achievements. Accusing Teh-
ran of sponsoring terrorism, Trump 
created a four-step ‘strategy’ to deal 
with the Iranian threat, which involved cooperating with allies against Iran’s 
destabilizing policies and terrorist activities, imposing additional sanctions on 
Iran, targeting Iran’s ballistic missile capabilities, and preventing Iran from de-
veloping nuclear weapons.11
Although the Trump Administration is clearly not sympathetic to Iran, the 
U.S. seems to lack the necessary approach and instruments to launch a sustain-
able and comprehensive campaign against Tehran, despite unveiling its strat-
egy. This is partly due to Iran’s growing sphere of influence since the U.S. inva-
sion of Iraq, the Obama Administration’s willingness to look the other way as 
Tehran strengthened its regional appeal, and the ability of great powers, most 
notably Russia, to consolidate their power in the Middle East. At the same 
time, certain policymakers in Washington seem to be against an unnecessary 
fight against Iran (barring the nuclear issue) and the launch of new military 
campaigns at the behest of Israel and Saudi Arabia. Keeping in mind domestic 
tensions in the U.S., Washington will arguably refrain from making an effort 
to contain and limit Iran –not to the extent that Israel and Saudi Arabia expect 
from them anyway. The U.S. failure to prevent Bashar al-Assad’s regime and 
Iranian-backed militias from controlling Syria’s crucial land border with Iraq, 
coupled with its decision to stop supporting the moderate rebels –the only 
legitimate force capable of withstanding Iranian influence in Syria– is proof of 
Washington’s overall lack of interest. Simply put, the Trump’s Iran policy seems 
limited to statements and moral support to Saudi Arabia and Israel rather than 
a sustainable roadmap.
In recent months, Jared Kushner plays a significant role in negotiations with 
Saudi Arabia and Israel as well as Washington’s search for strategic harmony 
with those countries. Having developed a close relationship with Israeli Prime 
Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, MbS and MbZ, Kushner seeks to find a solu-
tion to tensions between Palestine and Israel, advocate Iran’s containment and 
create a new regional order to mount pressure on rival ideologies and groups 
in the Middle East. The main problem is that the aforementioned players tend 
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to have their own priorities and pursue their own agendas, even though they 
agree on various issues. In other words, the language of common ground ap-
pears to be used by all players involved to reach their own goals. Those differ-
ences, which are hard to address, prevent comprehensive and result-oriented 
steps from being taken despite their agreement on Iran.
Israel: The Immediate Beneficiary of Regional Chaos
Throughout the Syrian crisis, Israel made headlines mostly by carrying out 
airstrikes against Hezbollah’s weapons convoys. The country viewed the Arab 
Spring’s reversal as a strategic victory. The 2013 military coup d’état in Egypt, 
in particular, expanded Israel’s room for maneuver in the region and made it 
possible for Tel Aviv to mount pressure on Hamas. By contrast, Israel has per-
petually remained on the fence in Syria. On the one hand, it welcomed the 
ability of a weakened Assad regime to remain in power. On the other, it viewed 
the growing power of Iran and Hezbollah in Syria as a national security threat. 
Although Israel launched airstrikes against strategic targets and weapons con-
voys, and created a buffer zone along its Syrian border with the help of rebel 
groups, including the Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), it has been threatened by 
the manpower and weapons available to Iran and Hezbollah. As a matter of 
fact, Israeli officials claim that Hezbollah has transferred missiles to Lebanon, 
where it allegedly established production facilities. A military incursion against 
Syria and Lebanon, however, remains unpopular in Israel. The fact that Tel Aviv 
failed to take comprehensive military action against the Assad regime in the 
wake of the downing of an Israeli F-16 military jet by Syria attests to that fact.
Although Israel followed the gradual empowerment of Iran, its traditional ri-
val, over the past twenty years, it failed to ensure the adoption of necessary pol-
icies by the U.S. –especially during the Obama presidency. Having to choose 
between limiting Iran’s nuclear capacity and curbing its regional influence at 
the time, the international community managed to address the first issue by 
making a nuclear deal, yet made no effort regarding the latter. This situation 
most deeply frustrated Israel and Saudi Arabia. With Trump in the White 
House, the two countries were able to put Iran on top of Washington’s list of 
national security threats. During the Obama presidency, when Washington 
neglected its traditional allies in the region, Saudi Arabia and Israel formed 
contacts through UAE mediation in the hopes of holding policy talks against 
Iran. Under Trump, in turn, the shared concerns of Washington, Riyadh and 
Tel Aviv facilitated active cooperation. Although Kushner’s close relationship 
with Netanyahu, MbS and MbZ hasn’t translated into concrete policy as yet, it 
certainly made it possible for that cooperation to become deeper.12
Fundamentally, Israel shares Saudi Arabia’s concerns about Iran. Unlike Ri-
yadh, however, it does not want to fight the Iranians across the region. Israel’s 
priority is to address the growing Hezbollah presence in Lebanon and to se-
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cure its land border with Syria. Therefore, what it primarily has in common 
with Saudi Arabia is shared hostility towards Hezbollah. As a matter of fact, 
senior Saudi officials accuse Hezbollah of training the Houthi rebels in Ye-
men.13 Under the circumstances, it is possible to claim that the two countries 
will primarily target Hezbollah and, by extension, that Saudi Arabia’s efforts to 
influence Lebanon through Hariri are part of that policy. It is more likely, how-
ever, that Israel stick to targeted strikes instead of launching a comprehensive 
offensive against Hezbollah, provided that Tel Aviv came to expect less from 
the Trump Administration on Iran. One could argue that Israel won’t launch a 
military operation against Hezbollah, which is far more powerful than it was 
in 2006, under the leadership of its cautious Prime Minister Netanyahu.
UAE: The Background Player
The tiny Gulf country played an important role in crushing the Arab Spring 
and the 2013 military coup d’état in Egypt.14 Again, the UAE remains the stron-
gest advocate of MbS’ rise to power in Saudi Arabia. Keeping a low profile in 
the crown princes’ ambitious push for regional power, the UAE encourages 
MbS and Saudi Arabia to take risky steps at home and abroad. The mass ar-
rests in the Kingdom and MbS’ foreign policy decisions were presumably in-
fluenced by Abu Dhabi. Having supported the Saudi crown prince’s military 
campaign in Yemen, the country hasn’t been directly affected by the Yemen 
crisis and therefore feels less pressure than Saudi Arabia. The Emiratis, who 
made a name for themselves by supporting military coups, civil wars and var-
ious political-military moves during the Arab Spring,15 have been able to take 
bolder steps primarily because they haven’t directly experiences the negative 
side effects of regional chaos –which they helped fuel.
As chief financier of Khalifa Haftar’s coup in Libya and Sisi’s violent overthrow 
of Mohamed Morsi’s democratically elected government in Egypt, the UAE 
seeks to reshape the Middle East by lobbying Washington policymakers and 
using pro-status quo players and other non-state actors as proxies. Having de-
veloped relatively serious operational capabilities compared to its size, Abu 
Dhabi has formed strategic alliances with Israel and certain groups in the U.S. 
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Ironically, the country has the strongest trade relations with Iran in the Gulf 
region.16 Therefore, whether the UAE genuinely wants to contain Iran remains 
questionable –although the country employs visibly anti-Iran language. At the 
very least, Abu Dhabi and Riyadh seem to have certain disagreements over 
Iran’s containment. Having operated in the shadows of Saudi Arabia, Israel 
and the U.S. until now, the UAE possibly wants to exploit the various crises 
faced by Saudi Arabia to become more active in Gulf politics. In other words, 
Emirati decision makers seem to believe that they can play a more active role 
in the Middle East –whether or not Riyadh’s gamble pays off.
Iran: A Policy of Expansionism
Since the U.S. invasion of Iraq, Iran and its proxies have steadily strengthened 
their influence in the Middle East. Having played a crucial role in Syria’s violent 
crackdown on peaceful protests and fueling hot conflicts, Tehran has exploited 
regional chaos to consolidate its power in many parts of the region through 
its many proxies. In Iraq, for example, there are notable parallels between the 
rise of ISIS and the growth of Iranian influence. In this regard, Iran effectively 
used ISIS and al-Qaeda threats to legitimize its expansionist policies. At this 
time, the Iranians are the most effective foreign player in Iraq, Lebanon, Syria 
(along with Russia), and Yemen (through their proxy, Houthi rebels). Keeping 
part of the Syria-Iraq border under control, the country has been able to create 
a logistics corridor between Tehran and Beirut. At the same time, the Iranians 
are able to manage the flow of foreign fighters inside this corridor through the 
proxy of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps.
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Iran has a number of advantages 
in its geopolitical struggle with Is-
rael and the Gulf; therefore, Tehran 
believes that it can deal with the 
increasingly vocal anti-Iran front. 
In addition to having natural al-
lies among Shia in Gulf countries, 
investing heavily into proxy forces 
in the region and controlling ac-
tive militant groups on the ground, 
Iran counts on conflicts of interest 
within the anti-Iran bloc and the 
lack of a regional consensus to target Tehran. It is difficult to argue that the 
anti-Iran bloc, which has been unable to curb Tehran’s influence in Yemen and 
Syria, has been able to develop a comprehensive and result-oriented strategy 
to achieve success in Lebanon –where Iran’s most powerful proxy is in a dom-
inant position.
The main source of Iran’s fragility outside its borders is the over-extension 
of its military in the region, whereas domestically it faces several challenges, 
including social and economic problems, the ineffectiveness of the state ap-
paratus and political divisions fueled by ethnic and religious diversity. Most 
recently, the transformation of localized grievances into countrywide protests, 
the high death toll in Tehran’s crackdown on protestors and the direct targeting 
of the Iranian regime by the crowds revealed the state’s weaknesses yet again. 
Although those protests were born out of domestic grievances, a number of 
statements were issued by the U.S. and members of the anti-Iran bloc in sup-
port of the protestors. In other words, the anti-Iran bloc viewed the protests as 
a way to render Tehran more fragile and to deepen divisions inside the coun-
try. To be clear, statements of support by countries like Israel and the U.S. were 
considered proof by the regime that the protestors were part of a conspiracy 
against Tehran. Due to the harsh crackdown, coupled with the de-legitimiza-
tion of the protests with references to international support behind them, the 
protests gradually died out and it became clear that such protests couldn’t be 
exploited by regional powers. Still, domestic fragility and divisions in Tehran 
could prove useful for the anti-Iran bloc, if they develop a concrete strategy.
Iran’s regional expansionism, use of sectarian identity as a geopolitical tool and 
willingness to engage in hot conflict with other countries through its proxies 
on the ground make the country a serious threat to other regional powers.17 
Therefore, Iranian expansionism and the Tehran-controlled militias represent 
problems that must be solved without delay. Keeping in mind where they op-
erate, it is clear that a regional agreement could solve that problem. Iran’s ex-
pansionism has been able to continue due to the failure of regional players to 
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reach a consensus, the rise of regional polarization and conflict (which hinders 
the emergence of counter-balances to Tehran) and pressures on mainstream 
Sunni groups.
Russia: The Balancing Global Power
Though not a direct party to regional competition and/or design efforts in the 
Middle East, Russia seeks to shape the debate by making critical touches. Hav-
ing witnessed their influence in the Middle East vanish after the Cold War, 
the Russians made a spectacular comeback to the region by filling the power 
vacuum created by the Syrian conflict. Although the country has not been able 
to create its own order anywhere but in Syria, it certainly has emerged as a 
balancing force in regional matters. At this point, it would be difficult to sug-
gest that Moscow had a grand strategy in the Middle East. However, Russian 
President, Vladimir Putin, actively uses the Middle East as part of his plan to 
restore his country’s global position as a challenge to U.S. power.18
The Russian military intervention in Syria tilted the balance of power to the 
Assad regime’s advantage. At this time, the country seeks to reflect its deterrent 
force in Syria to other conflict zones and areas of disagreement. Having formed 
an alliance with Iran in Syria to keep the Assad regime in power, Moscow 
has actively opposed attacks by the anti-Iran bloc against Tehran. Although 
the Russians have a different set of priorities than both Iran and the regime 
in Syria, it has emerged as the global patron of both parties. Emerging as a 
‘playmaker’ in Syria and seeking to perpetuate its accomplishments, Russia’s 
influence in other countries has been considerably less. Still, the country made 
an effort to take its relations with regional powers, including Turkey, Iran, Is-
rael, Saudi Arabia and Egypt, to a new level.19 At a minimum, Russia sought 
to limit the room for maneuver available to the group of countries, led by the 
U.S., attempting to redesign the Middle East through deterrence and potential 
actions. Although Moscow developed a special relationship with Tel Aviv, it 
nonetheless opposed Washington’s unilateral actions regarding Jerusalem and 
Palestine. Pursuing a special relationship with Haftar in Libya and Egypt’s Sisi, 
the country sought to create an alternative to the relations between those play-
ers and Western countries. Maintaining a neutral position regarding the Qatar 
blockade, Moscow has been openly critical of the U.S. role in the crisis. Mean-
while, the Russians have been largely absent from Yemen and Lebanon. Still, 
the country started playing a more active role in the Middle East, hoping to 
present an alternative to regional players having trouble with their global allies. 
Through those steps, Russia has played a balancing role in regional conflicts 
and competition.
Turkey: Multilateral Engagement
Having traditionally played a balancing role in tensions between Iran and the 
Gulf and Israel, Turkey made an effort to de-escalate tensions instead of par-
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ticipating in the conflict. Although the country has 
strong economic relations with Iran and held ne-
gotiations with Iran and Iraq on the Syrian conflict 
and the KRG independence referendum, it has been 
critical of Tehran’s expansionism in recent years. 
Turkey’s take on the current crisis and its regional 
repercussions, however, differs from the views of 
both sides.
Turkey essentially compartmentalizes its relations 
with Iran into two areas. The first group consists of 
bilateral contacts on politics, security, culture and the 
economy. With the exception of economic relations, 
it is difficult to argue that the relationship has been 
uncomplicated. However, Ankara seeks to compart-
mentalize the various areas, hoping that problems 
in one area won’t have a negative impact on others. Due to this process of 
compartmentalization, Turkey and Iran have been able to continue dialogue 
at times of crisis and despite certain disagreements. The Turkish government’s 
position on the most recent wave of protests in Iran, for example, differed from 
the anti-Iran bloc. Noting that the protests were a domestic Iranian issue, Tur-
key criticized outside interventions in the country’s internal affairs. 
The second area relates to Iranian expansionism in the Middle East. Like many 
other regional powers, the Turks are unhappy with Tehran’s expansionist 
agenda, efforts to fuel instability through proxies and exploitation of sectarian 
identity for geopolitical gain. In recent years, the relations between Turkey and 
Iran have been strained primarily for this reason. The countries disagree most 
visibly in Syria, where Iran provides unconditional (and bloody) support to 
Bashar al-Assad’s regime and fuels region-wide instability by deploying tens 
of thousands of militias to the conflict zone. Likewise, it is no secret that Iran 
has been one of the most vocal critics of Operation Olive Branch and deployed 
certain militia groups to Afrin in order to support the terrorist organization 
PKK. Although Syria talks are underway within the Astana framework, the 
two countries do not see eye-to-eye in this area. Therefore, it is important to 
note that Turkey, Russia and Iran haven’t formed an actual bloc –even though 
they facilitated dialogue in Astana and Sochi. With regard to Iranian expan-
sionism, Turkey agrees with the anti-Iran bloc in select areas. In particular, 
the Turks share the concerns of Israel and the Gulf on the presence of Irani-
an-backed militias in Syria.
The reason why Turkey raises questions about the anti-Iran bloc’s roadmap is 
because it does not want the current tensions between Iran and Israel and the 
Gulf to evolve into a hot conflict. The country maintains that methodological 
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errors and competing priorities among members of the bloc, which has yet to 
produce a sustainable strategy, could unleash a new wave of chaos in the Mid-
dle East. After all, it is necessary for the various players, which would like to 
contain Iranian expansionism, to reach a consensus and concentrate on shared 
goals. Instead, the developments that took place in the wake of Trump’s visit to 
Riyadh fueled polarization, jeopardizing any hope of a consensus and distract-
ing the various countries from their goals. For example, the Qatar crisis, an 
ideologically motivated issue that occurred at a time when consolidating the 
Gulf was crucial, actually undermined the fight against Iranian expansionism. 
Interestingly enough, countries like Qatar and various movements, which do 
not share the ideology of Israel and the Gulf, are effectively compelled to side 
with Tehran in this conflict. Nonetheless, Turkey continues to maintain cordial 
relations with both Iran and countries like Saudi Arabia.
Particularly the ideologically-motivated actions of the UAE tend to distract the 
bloc’s attention from Iran and effectively expand Tehran’s room to maneuver. 
Meanwhile, Abu Dhabi’s hostility towards Turkey goes beyond the borders of 
the Middle East. It is no secret that the UAE’s media outlets have been smear-
ing Turkish military bases in Somalia and Qatar, the country’s ambassador to 
the U.S. invested heavily into anti-Turkish lobbying efforts and think tanks, 
such as the Foundation for the Defense of Democracies, which sought to le-
gitimize the July 15 coup attempt in Turkey, receive funding from Abu Dhabi. 
The country’s ideologically-motivated approach poisons Turkey-Gulf relations 
just as it created major problems for Saudi Arabia in Yemen.
One of the biggest shortcomings of the anti-Iran bloc’s roadmap to contain 
Tehran’s influence is related to the alienation of mainstream actors with the po-
tential to limit Iran’s religious and social influence in the region. Provided that 
MbS’ push for ‘moderate Islam’ will create an apolitical Salafism rather than 
a mainstream Sunni identity, Iran’s containment seems unlikely without that 
religious and social hinterland. In the absence of Sunni movements, which in 
many countries are being eliminated under pressure from the Gulf bloc, efforts 
to contain Iranian influence will be devoid of a strong religious and sociolog-
ical basis. To be clear, the movements in question closely resemble Turkey’s 
religious and sociological background and political positions. To weaken Teh-
ran’s political influence, the divisions among and the erosion of Sunni political 
movements in countries with strong Iranian influence, from Yemen to Iraq, 
must be addressed. Therefore, the Gulf must think strategically, rather than 
ideologically, to strengthen its ties to regional players like Turkey and promote 
the mainstream’s political participation in relevant countries.
At this time, there is no axis that could counter-balance the polarization be-
tween Iran and Israel and the Gulf countries, which concentrates on the Mid-
dle East but affects a range of countries from Pakistan to Morocco, and to 
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reduce existing tensions. Turkey does not have the capacity to overcome the 
polarization between Iran, Israel and the Gulf by forming a new axis either. 
Instead, the country engages in indirect criticism of the Gulf countries and 
direct criticism of Iran, and expects regional players to cooperate more closely 
and create a new order. Still, Turkey provides ‘balancing’ support to countries, 
which have been negatively affected by said polarization, in order to preserve 
a neutral middle ground. At the same time, the country seeks to strengthen its 
defense cooperation, along with political and economic relations, with coun-
tries like Kuwait, Oman and Pakistan, with which it sees eye-to-eye in a num-
ber of areas.
The Stages of Polarization
Providing a brief summary regarding the individual game plans of regional 
and global powers helps to understand better the polarization that is taking 
shape in the region during the last years. The power struggle between Iran 
and the anti-Iran bloc has gone beyond a rivalry in recent months and evolved 
into a regional calibration effort. This competition and calibration attempt 
takes place in other countries –rather than Iran and its opponents. Yemen, 
Saudi Arabia’s top priority; Qatar, the UAE’s main focus; Lebanon, where the 
anti-Iran bloc faces the greatest challenges; Syria, where Iran consolidated its 
power and regional fault lines have been broken; and Palestine, which is Is-
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rael’s top priority, set the stage for the most recent 
developments. 
Qatar: An Ideologically-Charged Blockade
Under ordinary circumstances, the anti-Iran bloc 
would be expected to strengthen their alliances with 
other countries in their fight against Iran. However, 
it became clear that realpolitik meant little for the 
Saudi-led Gulf coalition’s Qatar policy. Saudi Ara-
bia and the UAE, which accused Doha of meddling 
in the internal affairs of Arab countries, supporting 
terrorism and collaborating with Iran, launched a 
blockade with support from several countries where 
they exerted considerable influence. Saudi Arabia, Egypt and the UAE had 
been critical of Qatar’s anti-establishment position during the Arab Spring 
and, in particular, its relationship with the Muslim Brotherhood. This com-
petition, at the heart of which lie ideological differences, manifested itself in 
Syria, Egypt, Libya and Palestine.
Having competed (and even clashed) with Qatar in various parts of the world in 
the past, the anti-Qatar bloc began to target Doha as part of their new regional 
blueprint. Their requirements for lifting the blockade aimed at subjecting Qatar 
to a comprehensive political and ideological recalibration. Some of those con-
ditions were as follows: severing diplomatic ties with Iran, cutting ties with ter-
rorist organizations such as the Muslim Brotherhood, ISIS, al-Qaeda and Hez-
bollah, shutting down Al Jazeera and its sister networks, eliminating Turkey’s 
military presence in Qatar, cutting financial support to all individuals and or-
ganizations viewed as ‘terrorists’ by Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Bahrain and the UAE, 
etc. Qatar had to meet these demands within 10 days and allow a monitoring 
mission to establish whether or not Qatar accepts and executes these demands.
These conditions, which Qatar considered unacceptable, were particularly 
significant because they showed the deepening political and ideological dif-
ferences between Qatar, Saudi Arabia and the UAE over the past seven years. 
Needless to say, Trump’s Riyadh visit and Washington’s efforts to reshape the 
Middle East in cooperation with Israel and the Gulf countries played an im-
portant role in the transformation of disagreements into a blockade. The Qatar 
crisis is important for at least two reasons. It shows the agenda of the U.S., Is-
rael and the Gulf countries, formed on the basis of hostility towards Iran, goes 
beyond containing Tehran. Secondly, it establishes the anti-Iran bloc ideolog-
ical steps, such as the Qatar blockade, instead of adhering to realpolitik. After 
all, it is possible to argue that Qatar has been fighting Iranian proxies in Syria, 
Yemen, Lebanon and Iraq for years. The fact that Doha has been punished, 
citing its relationship with Tehran, suggests that the blockade was about ideo-
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logical differences and Qatar’s independent foreign policy initiatives rather 
than Iran itself. In other words, the Qatar crisis was a manifestation of the 
deepening ideological divide rather than the traditional Iran-Gulf rivalry in 
the Middle East.
Lebanon: On the Brink of Explosion
One of the most politically fragile countries in the Middle East, Lebanon made 
headlines again in recent months due to Saudi Arabia’s attempt to remove 
Prime Minister Saad Hariri from power. Although domestic tensions in the 
country received little attention against the backdrop of the Syrian civil war, its 
political balance of power remained fragile and sensitive nonetheless. In ad-
dition to failing to elect a president, Lebanon has experienced immense pres-
sure due to Hezbollah’s involvement in the Syrian civil war and violent clashes 
along its porous border with Syria. Again, the country took a backseat to the 
situation in Syria, which captured the attention of various players including 
Hezbollah.
Saudi Arabia made a surprise move in late 2017 to summon Lebanese Prime 
Minister Saad Hariri to Riyadh, where he was forced to announce his resigna-
tion. The controversial announcement fueled allegations that Hariri was being 
held against his will in the Saudi capital. The Lebanese leader made the case 
that he was not detained in an interview with al-Mustaqbal to no avail. Shortly 
afterwards, Hariri flew to Paris at the invitation of French President Emmanuel 
Macron before returning to Beirut, where he held a meeting with President 
Michel Aoun and announced that his decision to suspend his resignation.20 As 
such, Saudi Arabia’s political move proved unsuccessful.
Observers accounted for Hariri’s involuntary resignation in three ways. Ac-
cording to the first explanation, Riyadh was dissatisfied with the Lebanese 
prime minister’s crackdown on Hezbollah. Others suggested that Saudi Arabia 
wanted to start a political crisis in Lebanon in an effort to marginalize Hezbol-
lah. Finally, some analysts argued that Hariri was an ally of the losing side in 
Saudi Arabia’s game of thrones.
The above mentioned explanations, individually and collectively, could ac-
count for the crisis. At this time, it would appear that Saudi Arabia is unwilling 
to launch a direct military intervention in Lebanon and instead seeks to paint 
a target on Hezbollah’s back through political and economic pressure. It seems 
more likely that Tel Aviv will conduct military operations against specific Hez-
bollah targets, whereas Israel and the U.S. build political and economic pres-
sure on the group.
At the same time, the crisis revealed the anti-Iran bloc hasn’t yet developed a 
clear strategy to combat Hezbollah in Lebanon –although they clearly intend 
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to take action. The lack of a coherent 
strategy, coupled with Hezbollah’s 
consolidation of military power 
over the past seven years, remains 
the most serious challenge to the 
anti-Iran bloc’s plans. The group, 
which continues to dominate Leb-
anese politics and the country’s na-
tional security structure, has further strengthened its grip largely thanks to 
the Syrian civil war. Meanwhile, Hezbollah is known to have relocated some 
of its forces from Syria to Lebanon due to the increasing likelihood of military 
intervention. Under the circumstances, it seems the effort to mount political 
pressure on Hezbollah through Hariri’s resignation has failed to make the de-
sired effect. Quite the contrary, the general population in Lebanon, including 
Sunni Muslims, criticizes Saudi Arabia. Moving forward, future steps against 
Hezbollah are unlikely to succeed unless the group’s adversaries develop a 
new, comprehensive and well thought-out strategy. It is therefore no coinci-
dence that Lebanon has been largely ignored by the anti-Iran bloc in the wake 
of Saudi Arabia’s failed Hariri move.
Yemen: A Crisis within a Crisis
Although Yemen doesn’t rank high in Washington or Tel Aviv’s lists of priori-
ties, it is atop of the list of external threats against Saudi Arabia. In the Yemen 
crisis, which was MbS’ first foreign policy and national security experiment, 
Saudi Arabia has been unable to get satisfactory results. Prolonged clashes, 
the Houthi movement’s increasing level of activity and Iran’s influence (which 
represents a self-fulfilling prophecy) fueled what the United Nations considers 
a major humanitarian crisis. The Houthi rebels, whose relationship with Iran 
was relatively weak in the past, joined forces with Ali Abdullah Saleh, a for-
mer Saudi ally, to seize control of strategic areas including the capital Sanaa. 
In response, Saudi Arabia and the UAE reached out to Saleh in an effort to 
turn him against the Houthis. His assassination by the Houthi rebels, however, 
significantly weakened the Saudi-UAE bloc’s position in Yemen. Unable to get 
results despite heavy air bombardment, Riyadh has yet to develop an exit strat-
egy from the war-torn country.
Although the UAE is often assumed to act in line with Saudi Arabia, Abu 
Dhabi seeks to divide Yemen –which is a considerable concern to Riyadh and 
the disagreement between Saudi Arabia and the UAE on policy has been one 
of the main reasons for their failure in Yemen. For example, Riyadh continues 
its loose partnership with the al-Islah movement backed by the al-Ahmar fam-
ily –an important part of the anti-Houthi bloc. The UAE, in turn, takes drastic 
measures against al-Islah due to the group’s links to the Muslim Brotherhood 
in Yemen. According to international monitors, Abu Dhabi has established 
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a secret network of prisons across Yemen, where a 
large number of locals, including members of al-Is-
lah, have been tortured to death.21
In Yemen, where the Saudi-Iranian rivalry took a vi-
olent turn, clashes have a local and regional nature. 
The Houthi rebels had formed militias when their 
relationship with Iran was considerably weaker 
than assumed. Ahead of the most recent clashes, 
the group stepped up its political and military co-
operation with Tehran. During this process, Iran is 
known to have indoctrinated Houthi fighters in an 
effort to turn them into a concrete threat against Saudi Arabia. The Houthis, 
who lack the political and military capacity to govern Yemen, exploit Riyadh’s 
strategic shortcomings and failure to mobilize international support. In truth, 
it is possible to suggest that a number of promises were made to Saudi Arabia 
with regard to Iran’s containment in Yemen. However, the messages of soli-
darity never translated into military and operational support –which raises 
questions about the methodology and chance of success of Riyadh and its 
allies.
Today, Saudi Arabia must keep a number of local and regional dynamics in 
mind. On the one hand, the country must support its allies in Yemen and find 
a solution to the humanitarian crisis. To be clear, the assassination of Ali Ab-
dullah Saleh significantly limited Riyadh’s options on the ground. Moving for-
ward, Saudi Arabia could step up its assault and strengthen its ties with local 
groups such as al-Islah. The UAE’s destructive effect, however, must be taken 
into consideration when it comes to al-Islah. In other words, Abu Dhabi will 
certainly make an effort to prevent closer cooperation between Saudi Arabia 
and al-Islah.
On the other hand, Saudi Arabia must gather regional and international sup-
port to contain Iran. At this time, it is possible to note that countries like the 
U.S. and Israel, with which Riyadh sees eye-to-eye on Lebanon, are unwill-
ing to provide concrete support to ongoing operations in Yemen. Under the 
circumstances, Saudi Arabia is compelled to create a new roadmap, which 
involves dialogue with local players, in order to prevent the further strength-
ening of Iran’s influence in the country. Otherwise, the potential challenges in 
Lebanon could emerge in Yemen to pose a direct threat to Riyadh.
Syria: The Heart of Proxy Wars
In the rivalry between Iran and its adversaries, Syria has witnessed an increase 
in Tehran’s influence over the years. Since the Syrian civil war broke out, Iran 
has been involved in the conflict –directly through the Revolutionary Guards 
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and indirectly through the proxy of Shia militias.22 The anti-Iran bloc, in turn, 
has taken steps either limited or not directly related to the regional rivalry. 
Although the U.S. supported the anti-regime opposition in the beginning, the 
fight against ISIS became Washington’s top priority in the wake of the siege 
of Ayn al-Arab.23 With a small number of exceptions, the U.S. refrained from 
taking action against the Assad regime and the Iranian influence in Syria. 
Meanwhile, Israel limited its involvement to airstrikes against the positions 
and military convoys of Hezbollah –which it considers a national security 
threat. Tel Aviv did not conduct operations that could change the balance of 
power in the Syrian conflict and limit Iranian expansionism. Rather, its pri-
ority has been to decrease Hezbollah’s missile capabilities and secure its land 
borders.
By contrast, Saudi Arabia was distracted from Syria, where it supported cer-
tain opposition groups historically, when conflict broke out in Yemen. Grad-
ually, the country decreased its military support to the moderate rebels. At 
this time, Saudi Arabia does not have enough proxies and instruments in 
Syria to challenge the Iranian influence. Having engaged in talks with cer-
tain tribes in Raqqa and Deir ez-Zor in cooperation with the UAE, Riyadh 
does not find itself in a position to use the tribal card against Iran. Although 
Saudi Arabia has a strong influence on the High Negotiations Committee, an 
umbrella body created to represent the Syrian opposition, it seeks to trans-
form the group by accommodating the objections of Cairo and Moscow. This 
step, which represents a political agreement with Russia, reduces the political 
transition prescribed by the UN Security Council’s Resolution No. 2254 to 
constitutional reform and elections without requiring Assad to step down –
which stands in contrast with Riyadh’s original position. It would appear that 
Russian President Putin and President Trump reached an understanding on 
narrowing down the scope of UNSC Resolution No. 2254 at their meeting in 
Vietnam.24
Although political negotiations over Syria reached a new stage, this new era 
is unlikely to benefit Saudi Arabia, Israel or the U.S., which agree on the goal 
of Iran’s containment –at least on paper. In other words, the Astana and Sochi 
talks are unlikely to provide strategic benefits to the Gulf countries, which have 
been unable to respond to Iran and Russia on the ground or at the negotiating 
table. After all, securing the regime’s future at a time when Assad continues to 
depend on Iran and Russia for his survival effectively means that Tehran’s pres-
ence in Syria will be consolidated. Although Saudi Arabia and the U.S. seem to 
adopt what is basically the Russian position, Iran will continue to strengthen 
its influence in Syria through its proxy, the Assad regime.
Moving forward, it is possible to suggest that the anti-Iran bloc will take two 
actions against Iran in Syria. First, Israel will continue to target the arsenals of 
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Iran and its proxies along with stra-
tegic areas. By taking that action, it 
will seek to limit and deter the Ira-
nian threat emanating from Syria. 
At the same time, Israel will seek 
to stop military deployment from 
Syria to Lebanon. Secondly, the 
anti-Iran bloc will engage in talks 
with Russia in an effort to fuel ten-
sions between the Russians and the 
Iranians over Syria. Moreover, the 
Gulf countries could engage with 
the Assad regime as well as coop-
erate with the YPG, the designated 
terrorist organization PKK’s Syrian 
branch, against Iran. Operation Olive Branch, however, established that the 
YPG militants, to whom the UAE reached out in the past, are not an effective 
force against Tehran.
Palestine: The Heart of the Conflict
The developments in Yemen, Lebanon and Syria resulted in increased polit-
ical activity in Palestine. The anti-Iran bloc –namely the U.S., Saudi Arabia, 
the UAE and Israel– seems to be directly involved in the most recent devel-
opments in the area. Likewise, Egypt works together with the Gulf to use its 
influence on Palestinian politics and its land border as a trump card. Although 
it is not directly related to the goal of Iran’s containment, Palestine remains an 
important item on the anti-Iran bloc’s agenda.
In October 2017, Fatah and Hamas agreed to form a reconciliation govern-
ment. The negotiations were brokered by Egypt and Dahlan under the auspices 
of Saudi Arabia and the UAE. The newly-formed government took steps to 
promote social reconciliation by providing financial support to the families of 
Palestinians, who died in clashes following Dahlan’s coup attempt in Gaza. To 
be clear, this move was orchestrated by the UAE to facilitate Dahlan’s return 
to Palestinian politics. Following the reconciliation government’s takeover of 
border crossings in Hamas-controlled Gaza, Egypt responded by opening the 
Rafah border crossing. Finally, against the backdrop of Lebanese Prime Minis-
ter Saad Hariri, Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas was summoned to Ri-
yadh to hold talks with Saudi officials. Abbas was allegedly told by Saudi Ara-
bia to accept Jared Kushner’s ‘peace’ plan or resign from his post and warned 
about the armed wing of Hamas and the Iranian influence over the group.25
It is possible to argue that the UAE and Saudi Arabia seek to weaken the military 
wing of Hamas to broker an agreement between the group and Fatah, whilst 
UAE and Saudi Arabia seek 
to weaken the military 
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blockade through the proxy of 
Mohammad Dahlan and with 
the assistance of Egypt
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pledging economic recovery to Palestinians aggrieved by the blockade through 
the proxy of Mohammad Dahlan and with the assistance of Egypt. Their goal is 
to create a new political environment in Palestine, where Dahlan can become 
more popular and support the ‘peace’ plan developed by Jared Kushner and 
his close ally, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu. As members of the 
anti-Iran bloc, Saudi Arabia and the UAE have supported this plan. Their at-
tempts to undermine UN efforts to condemn the Trump Administration’s Jeru-
salem move could be considered linked to the same group identity. Particularly, 
the decision by Mahmoud Abbas to attend the Organization of Islamic Coop-
eration’s İstanbul summit could result in the aforementioned alliance’s raising 
questions about Palestinian leadership. The greatest obstacle to the success of 
the aid plan is the lack of consensus between the various parties and the fact 
that there are a lot of moving parts. Implementing this plan could contribute to 
the fight against Iran by minimizing Iran’s influence over Palestine, which took 
a hit during the Syrian civil war. It is important to note, however, that mount-
ing pressure on Palestinian groups –in particular the military wing of Hamas– 
could create additional room to maneuver for Iran in Palestine.
Conclusion: Regional Rivalry or Re-design Attempt?
A quick look at the range of players and countries in the Middle East, who 
are engaged in conflict and/or competition, shows that we cannot account for 
the emerging alliances and developments in the region with reference to Iran’s 
containment. It would appear that Iran’s containment is part of a broader effort 
by the emerging bloc to redesign the region. All previously-mentioned stake-
holders consider the chaotic environment in the Middle East and the Trump 
presidency as an opportunity to further their agendas. In a rush to seize that 
opportunity, they seek to impose their own agendas on the rest. This situation, 
coupled with special agendas, has effectively undermined efforts to combat 
Iranian influence in the Middle East.
At a time when coordination in the Gulf region is absolutely crucial, the Qatar 
blockade, which started with accusations against Doha, weakened the fight 
against Iran. The blockade, which has been upheld by the UAE in particu-
lar, compels Qatar to work more closely with Tehran. The Qatar blockade, a 
product of intra-Gulf rivalry and the UAE’s ideologically-motivated war, cre-
ates tensions in the region that Iran could exploit, and renders impossible any 
kind of coordination. At the same time, the marginalization of Kuwait by Saudi 
Arabia and the UAE represents a method to which the anti-Iran bloc must not 
resort. Likewise, the systematic targeting of Turkish interests by Abu Dhabi 
and its extensions in Saudi Arabia suggest that either their actual goal isn’t to 
contain Iran or they suffer from an extraordinary lack of strategic depth. Iron-
ically, Turkey is a unique player that shares the concerns of Israel and the Gulf 
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on Iranian expansionism whilst dis-
agreeing with the anti-Iran bloc on 
other issues.
As chaos looms in the region, Saudi 
Arabia, the U.S., Israel and the UAE 
are involved in some kind of grand 
bargain. The purpose of the said 
bargain is to redesign the Middle 
East, which was shaken by the Arab 
Spring, by creating a new status 
quo. Despite suffering from a short-
age of necessary tools and strategy, 
the anti-Iran bloc seeks to restore the status quo by containing Iran. The new 
status quo would involve the weakening of Iran in Lebanon and Yemen, where 
it poses a direct threat to the anti-Iran bloc, the reincarnation of the regime 
in Syria, forcing Palestine to reach an agreement with Israel under Dahlan’s 
leadership, disciplining Gulf rivals, such as Qatar, through economic and even 
military measures, reviving the pre-Arab Spring dominant ideology by paying 
lip service to reforms, and targeting state and non-state actors that object to 
that ideology.
It appears that the Trump presidency’s effect on the Middle East will be to 
fuel polarization between Iran, Israel and the Gulf rather than to create a new 
regional order. This situation, in turn, makes Saudi Arabia, Israel and the UAE 
–the ambitious players– look for a new regional design. However, the instru-
ments mobilized by Iran, coupled with the Gulf ’s inadequate capacity and 
Washington’s lack of a coherent strategy, could only serve to deepen regional 
chaos. 
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